Global Warming Is Real
Caused By Human Activity
We Have to
Using Fossil Fuels
Price Projections
Wilfred Candler
17th June, 2008
The following price data, see Annex 1, are for “Illinois Basin Posted Crude Oil Prices”. They clearly lag behind the popularly quoted NYMEX Light Sweet Crude futures contract prices. However, they give a picture of a rapidly changing oil market. Our current high prices have been achieved without any serious effort by OPEC to force prices higher. (Currently 080617 it has been announced that Saudi Arabia will raise production by 0.5 million barrels a day, but this looks as if OPEC is maxed out).
The 1979 oil embargo, led to an inflation adjusted maximum annual price of $97.68, we are now well above this price. Starting from 2003, with inflation adjusted price of $32.34, price doubled 3 years later to $62.11, and seems set to double again 2 years later.
We have $4.00+ gas at the pump, should we be preparing for $8.00 gas? And, how soon?
Annual Average Domestic Crude Oil Prices
1949-Present
U.S. Average
(in $/bbl.)
Year
Nominal
Inflation Adjusted 2007
2000
$27.39
$34.16
2001
$23.00
$27.92
2002
$22.81
$27.22
2003
$27.69
$32.34
2004
$37.66
$42.80
2005
$50.04
$54.99
2006
$58.30
$62.11
2007
$64.20
$66.40
2008 Partial
$97.98
$98.66
Monthly Average Domestic Crude Oil Prices
2008
U.S. Average
(in $/bbl.)
Month
Nominal
Inflation Adjusted 2007
Jan-08
$84.70
$86.20
Feb-08
$86.64
$87.92
Mar-08
$96.87
$97.46
Apr-08
$104.31
$104.31
May-08
$117.40
$117.40
DOE estimates of changed oil production and consumption are given below, in millions of barrels a day. The bold italics numbers are still estimates and explain why total world demand and supply in 2007 differ.
<------------2003----------->
<-----------------2007------------------->
D-S
Supply
Demand
Net D-S
Supply
Demand
Net D-S
Change
OECD2
2007-2003
United States3, 4
8.80
20.03
11.24
8.48
20.70
12.22
0.98
Other OECD
14.46
28.57
14.11
12.93
28.25
15.32
1.20
Total OECD
23.25
48.60
25.35
21.42
48.95
27.54
2.18
Non-OECD
China A
3.56
5.58
2.02
3.90
7.58
3.68
1.66
Former U.S.S.R.
10.43
3.91
-6.52
12.61
4.28
-8.33
-1.82
Other Non-OECD B
42.38
21.52
-20.86
46.62
24.58
-22.04
-1.18
Total Non-OECD
56.36
31.01
-25.35
63.13
36.43
-26.70
-1.34
Total World Supply
79.62
79.61
0.00
84.55
85.38
0.84
0.84
Where I have written Demand and Supply, DOE writes more accurately Production and Consumption /Disappearance. Production and Consumption cannot differ, and DOE will, I am sure, eventually reconcile its data to achieve balance. In the mean time it is revealing to see that initial estimates suggest that demand exceeds supply by about 0.84 million barrels a day (mbd). Looking at the figures we can see that US demand increased by 0.63 mbd, while production declined by 0.32 mbd, resulting in an increase in net demand of almost one mbd. Other OECD managed to actually reduce demand (slightly) however, this was more than off-set by a decline in production (presumably mostly from the UK), resulting in a net demand increase of 1.2 mbd. China, Russia, and Other Non-OECD all increased supply, but in China a much larger increase in demand led to a net demand increase of 1.66 mdb. In Other Non-OECD (mostly OPEC) a large increase in production was almost swallowed up by a 3 mbd increase in consumption.
Looking at year by year oil supply we can see that supply has been flat to very mildly declining for the last two years.
Putting the last two tables together helps explain why the oil market has “gone wild”. With essentially stable production and an annual growth in demand from China and OPEC consumers of about 1.25 mbd, the rest of the world is being asked to reduce consumption by about 1.25 mbd, or say about 3% a year for OECD countries if they bear the brunt of the adjustment. Moreover this is not a one time adjustment we need to think of a 3% reduction in one year or 12% in four years. What is more, there is no assurance that world oil production will be able to stabilize at 84.5 mbd, if production begins to decline the needed consumption adjustments will be even more severe.
What are the price prospects if the US had to reduce consumption by 3% of its 2007 consumption year after year? That is by 0.621 mbd per year. Then oil supply would be as shown in the second column below. Price would depend on the elasticity of demand. At the one extreme we might assume that the price elasticity is -1.00, as shown in the right hand column. This is a “special” elasticity, corresponding to keeping total expenditure on the commodity unchanged even when the price changes. Thus in 2007 with a supply of 20.70 million barrels and a price (right hand column) of $66.40 per barrel expenditure $1.374 billion per day, in 2013 with a supply of 16.97 million barrels a day, but a price of $81.00 per barrel the expenditure is again $1.374 billion per day.
Intermediate columns give the results for alternative guesses as to the elasticity of demand, with least elastic on the left. The more inelastic (i.e. the closer to zero while remaining negative) the demand, the more consumers increase expenditure on the commodity when price rises, in an attempt to maintain consumption.
Current price behavior suggests that the extremely inelastic demand elasticity of -0.65 may best fit what is being observed.
Price elasticity can change over time, also the adjustment to a sharp price rise that is expected to be short lived, will be less than the adjustment if the price rise is expected to be permanent. Two tendencies affect longer term adjustments (elasticities). On the one hand, the longer the price rise the more fundamental the adjustments that can be made. For a price spike it may be sufficient to drive less, for a permanent price rise buying a more efficient vehicle, or adjusting to using public transport may be appropriate. These ”more fundamental” changes taken over a longer term, explain why the longer the time period, the greater (more negative number) the price elasticity is expected to be.
However, there is another tendency as prices continue to rise. It is the phenomena of “the low hanging fruit”, that is there are a number of changes that can be made relatively painlessly, driving less, ride-sharing, using public transport, cutting back on holiday travel, etc. but once these relatively painless adjustments have been made, subsequent adjustments may be increasingly painful, ceasing to own a car, cutting out holiday travel, as people become increasingly reluctant to “pluck these high hanging fruit” their demand becomes correspondingly inelastic.
Fee and Rebate: What does this discussion have to do with a carbon (or gas) tax? Everything! It has been argued that the days of mindless expansion seem to be over, and that we are now living in a resource (well at least oil) constrained world. This may require the U.S. to cut its consumption of oil to say 18.84 mbd in 2010. If we rely on the market and if elasticity is as low as -0.065 then the price will have to rise to about $220 a barrel, to hold back demand. But note it does not matter how this price is arrived at. It could be $220 a barrel charged by the oil companies, or $60 a barrel charged by the oil companies, and $160 of tax: Tax revenue that could be rebated to consumers, unrelated to their expenditure on gasoline.
We now have $4.00 gasoline at the pump, almost all going to the oil companies. Two years ago when we were paying $2.00 at the pump, we could have instituted a gas tax of $2.00 thus raising the pump price to $4.00 (and inducing a consumption cut back in the face of higher prices) but used the $2.00 of tax revenue to pay a per capita rebate to all citizens, irrespective of their expenditure on gas.
A politician with foresight would institute a $4.00 gas tax right now, raising pump prices to $8.00, inducing a reduction in consumption, and financing a rebate to all citizens on the basis of the $4.00 a gallon tax revenue.
Second Order Effects: Things are not quite as simple as described above. Oil company behavior will be (slightly) affected by their income. The higher the tax, the less actively oil companies will compete on the world market for oil, and the more the Chinese and other expanding developing economies will get. But as they get more, the price they are willing to pay will decline, thus reducing transfers to oil producers. Moreover, if we can persuade the Chinese and other economies to join us in taxing gasoline, then we would tend to retain our relative shares, and in effect the tax would be paid by oil producers: There would be an income transfer from oil producers to oil consumers.
Annex 1
Historical Crude Oil Prices (Table)
Updated June 12, 2008
This table shows the Annual Average Crude Oil Price from 1946 to the present. Prices are adjusted for Inflation to April 2008 prices using the Consumer Price Index (CPI-U) as presented by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Note: Since these are ANNUALAverages they will not show the absolute peak price and will differ slightly from the Monthly Averages in our Oil Price Data in Chart Form.
Also note that although the monthly peak occurred in December 1979 the annual peak didn't occur until 1980 since the average of all the monthly prices was higher in 1980.
Inflation adjusted prices reached an all-time low in 1998 (lower than the price in 1946)! And now just ten years later we are at the all time high for crude oil (above the 1979-1980 prices) in real inflation adjusted terms.
Prices are based on historical free market (stripper) prices of Illinois Crude as presented by IOGA . Price controlled prices were lower during the 1970's but resulted in artificially created gas lines and shortages and do not reflect the true free market price.
For DOE production and consumption estimates see Excel file 2008/080616.oilDemand
Table 4.4 World Oil Supply1, 1970-2007
(Thousand Barrels per Day)
United
Persian
States2
Gulf 3
OAPEC4
OPEC5
World
1970 Average
11,673
13,541
14,571
23,684
48,941
1971 Average
11,554
15,940
15,427
25,612
51,751
1972 Average
11,601
17,734
16,451
27,447
54,569
1973 Average
11,428
20,895
18,656
31,386
59,301
1974 Average
10,978
21,550
18,399
31,109
59,392
1975 Average
10,505
19,223
16,831
27,545
56,511
1976 Average
10,251
21,847
19,563
31,137
61,123
1977 Average
10,437
22,098
20,372
31,821
63,667
1978 Average
10,820
21,067
19,819
30,454
64,227
1979 Average
10,707
21,569
22,575
31,663
66,975
1980 Average
10,809
18,541
20,715
27,776
63,987
1981 Average
10,739
15,894
17,619
23,737
60,602
1982 Average
10,783
12,815
13,786
20,038
58,098
1983 Average
10,788
11,676
12,416
18,769
57,934
1984 Average
11,107
11,433
12,619
18,858
59,568
1985 Average
11,192
10,320
11,498
17,666
59,172
1986 Average
10,905
12,377
13,585
19,810
61,407
1987 Average
10,648
12,794
13,911
20,034
62,086
1988 Average
10,473
14,234
15,581
22,128
64,380
1989 Average
9,880
15,655
16,577
23,971
65,508
1990 Average
9,677
16,178
17,161
25,218
66,426
1991 Average
9,883
15,662
16,701
25,383
66,399
1992 Average
9,768
16,953
17,776
26,629
66,564
1993 Average
9,602
17,733
18,406
27,431
67,091
1994 Average
9,413
18,320
18,948
28,229
68,588
1995 Average
9,400
18,630
19,299
28,955
70,272
1996 Average
9,445
18,781
19,495
29,500
71,917
1997 Average
9,461
19,578
20,324
30,831
74,158
1998 Average
9,278
20,895
21,543
31,992
75,654
1999 Average
8,993
20,232
20,896
30,886
74,840
2000 Average
9,058
21,520
22,128
32,726
77,762
2001 Average
8,957
20,905
21,426
32,026
77,684
2002 Average
9,000
19,680
20,455
30,265
76,995
2003 Average
8,797
21,134
22,006
31,877
79,615
2004 Average
8,700
22,997
23,711
34,449
83,124
2005 Average
8,322
23,892
24,709
36,092
84,631
2006 Average
8,331
23,630
24,607
35,831
84,598
2007 Average P
8,481
23,098
24,277
35,410
84,548
1. "Oil Supply" is defined as the production of crude oil (including lease condensate), natural gas plant liquids, and other liquids, and refinery processing gain (loss). For definitions of these terms see: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/ipsr/appc.html
2. U.S. geographic coverage is the 50 States and the District of Columbia. Beginning in 1993, includes fuel ethanol blended into finished motor gasoline and oxygenate production from merchant MTBE plants. For definitions of fuel ethanol, oxygenates, and merchant MTBE plants see: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/ipsr/appc.html
3. The Persian Gulf countries are Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Production from the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia Neutral Zone is included in Persian Gulf production.
4. OAPEC: Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries: Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
5. OPEC: Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries: Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela.
P=Preliminary data.
Revised data are in bold italic font.
Sources: See sources for Section 4 at: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/ipsr/source4.html